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Strengthening Local Political Leadership through Institutional Design: How and Why 
 




Over recent decades, the institutions of political leadership have been criticized for being 
caught up in outdated designs that are not adapting to societal changes. In many western 
countries, this diagnosis has spurred design reforms aimed at strengthening political 
leadership at the local level. Based on a study of reforms in Norwegian and Danish 
municipalities, this article first develops a typology of reforms aimed at strengthening local 
political leadership. Leadership reforms are categorized into four types aimed at 
strengthening Executive, Collective, Collaborative, or Distributive political leadership. The 
typology is then used to map the prevalence of the different types of reforms in the two 
countries. The results show that design reforms as such are more widespread in Danish than 
in Norwegian municipalities. In particular, reforms aimed at strengthening Distributive 
political leadership are used much more extensively in Denmark than in Norway. The article 
discusses the contextual differences that may explain this variation.  
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Introduction 
In his book Political Order and Political Decay (2014), Francis Fukuyama makes a 
compelling argument that the stability of institutions can also lead to their downfall. By 
failing to adapt to changes in the circumstances that brought them to life, the inherent 
conservatism of political institutions can become a source of political decay. In this 
perspective, the long-term success of political systems is characterized by institutional 
innovation and adaptable organizations capable of modifying their internal procedures in 
response to an ever-changing environment.  
As one of democracy’s most important cornerstones, local political leadership is perceived as 
a main target in need of innovation to meet such changing circumstances (Steyvers, Reynaert 




and Valcke 2012). Over recent decades, academic observers in the European setting have 
pointed to a wide number of developments urging the need to innovate political institutions at 
the local level. For example, in many countries the policy portfolio of local political 
organizations has vastly outgrown the size they were originally designed to manage. 
Simultaneously, local governments have become increasingly entangled with the multiple 
levels of government that frame the execution of municipal tasks (Steyvers et al. 2012). These 
developments put new strains on local political institutions that are also facing new demands 
from citizens regarding efficient governance, the quality of service delivery, and democratic 
participation (Torfing et al. 2012).  Moreover, years of new public management-inspired 
labour division between politicians and administration, a proliferation of statutory rights, and 
economic recession have, according to some observers, left local politicians with dwindling 
room to manoeuvre and an increasing sense of disempowerment (Torfing and Ansell 2017). 
Such perceived de-politicization challenges both the input and output legitimacy of local 
politics. Input legitimacy decreases when democratically elected representatives accountable 
to their constituencies are no longer in charge of policy development; output legitimacy 
decreases when policies are not forged on knowledge about local contexts, but rather on 
national regulations, or are hampered by dire public economies. 
This diagnosis has produced a call for stronger and more pronounced political leadership 
(Elgie 2014; Helms 2012) that has translated into a multitude of organizational reforms aimed 
at strengthening political leadership through institutional design (Grönlund, Bächtiger and 
Setälä 2014; Newton and Geissel 2012; Reuchamps and Suiter 2016; Smith 2009). Although 
the precise definition of political leadership is contested, the gist of the concept is that 
democratically elected politicians should be in the driver’s seat of policy development. While 
some comparative studies have identified a general European tendency towards institutional 
reforms strengthening the executive level of political leadership (e.g. Denters and Rose 
2005b), other observers have argued that such changes to leadership have been less 
pronounced in the Nordic countries (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004). More recently, some 
studies have suggested that the Nordic countries are currently witnessing a proliferation of 
experiments with new participatory forms of interactions between citizens and public 
authorities at the local level (e.g. Sørensen and Torfing 2018; Nyseth, Ringhold and Agger 
2019). There is, however, still scarce knowledge about the range of decentralized institutional 
innovations recently implemented in the Nordic countries, as well as the motives and 
contextual factors informing them.  




In the present study, we set out to map such locally initiated design reforms aimed at 
strengthening local political leadership in two Nordic countries – Denmark and Norway – 
through a three stepped mixed-methods research design. In the first part of the study, a 
combination of expert panels and crowdsourcing strategies was used to identify a variety of 
cases that could speak to the range of different locally initiated design reforms recently 
implemented in the two countries. In the second part of the study, we conducted a total of 70 
interviews, exploring 86 identified cases of design reforms, in an effort to gain more detailed 
knowledge about these reforms and the reasons for implementing them. Through an analysis 
informed by theoretical models of political leadership, we developed a typology that 
categorizes the identified reforms into four types of strategies aimed at strengthening different 
forms of political leadership. Finally, to gain a more extensive overview of the distribution of 
such reforms and possible cross-country variations, we conducted a survey in all 
municipalities of both Denmark and Norway.  
Through this elaborate research design, the main question posed in this article is: What forms 
of political leadership are promoted through locally initiated, institutional design reforms in 
Danish and Norwegian municipalities? 
Institutional design reforms are here understood as intentional changes to the organization or 
work practices of the municipal council, implemented by the municipalities themselves to 
affect the enactment of political leadership. Although the enactment of leadership is 
connected to constitutional framing, and thereby, in the words of Greasley and Stoker, 
“provide support to the idea that institutional design does make a difference” (2008: 728), 
intentional design changes to formal institutions do not necessarily equal a change to the 
enactment of political leadership in the intended way. As vigorously demonstrated by the 
New Institutionalism, the effects of reforms in formal political organizations cannot be a 
priori determined through their intentions (Peters 2012). Our categorization of reform types, 
presented in this article, therefore focuses on the intentions, or strategies, that inform the 
institutional reforms rather than on the actual effect they have on political leadership. 
Political Leadership  
The concept of political leadership is, as pointed out by Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight 
(2009:4), difficult to define essentially because it depends on institutional, cultural and 
historical contexts. Still, some functions presumed to characterize political leadership recur in 
a number of definitions. One such function is that of setting agenda, which involves 
interpreting the situation at hand and identifying the problems in need of political action 




(Greasly and Stoker 2008; Kellerman 2015; Leach and Wilson 2002). A second frequently 
emphasized function of political leadership is that of finding solutions to the problems facing 
the community (Gissendanner 2004; Leach and Wilson 2002; Kotter and Lawrence 1974; 
Masciulli et al. 2009; Tucker 1995). Finally, a third function is mobilizing support to enable 
the implementation of solutions to perceived problems (Svara 1990, 1994; Dyhrberg-
Noerregaard and Kjær 2014; Lawrence 1974). We understand political leadership as the 
enactment of these three functions. 
While defining political leadership as a set of functions may appear somewhat objective, 
theories and ideas about political leadership will inevitably be normatively charged. The 
deliberate attempts to design such institutional contexts, for example through the self-initiated 
design reforms discussed here, do not take place in a normative vacuum where all available 
reforms are equally likely to be chosen. Rather, design reforms will be informed by prevailing 
democratic ideals and normative notions about political leadership (Leach and Wilson 2002).  
Our own efforts to categorize local self-initiated reforms was initially based on a crude 
distinction between two such normative yardsticks which we assumed were likely to inform 
leadership reforms in the Danish and Norwegian contexts. The first is the ideal of 
representative democracy, depicting sovereign and accountable political leaders (e.g. Haus 
and Sweeting 2006; Kane, Patapart and Hart 2009). The second is the ideal of participatory 
democracy, depicting political leaders as facilitators for wider processes of public decision-
making involving actors outside the elected assembly (e.g. Sørensen 2006; Torfing and Ansell 
2017). As we discuss further below, our initial attempt to categorize the identified design 
changes in accordance with these two categories as either relatable to representative or 
participatory ideas of political leadership soon revealed the need for a more detailed typology 
to encompass the variety of reforms uncovered. Accordingly, this article demonstrates that 
reforms can be categorized into four categories aimed at strengthening Executive, Collective, 
Collaborative, or Distributive political leadership. The two broad ideals, representative and 
participatory political leadership, will be theoretically delineated below. The finer distinction 
of four separate types of political leadership reforms is developed in dialogue with the 
empirical evidence. 
Representative political leadership 
Ideas of political leadership based on elitist, representative models of democracy emphasize 
the importance of the power being contained within the electoral chain (Esaiasson 2011). 
Citizen involvement is limited to casting the ballot; between elections, agenda-setting and 




decision-making power rests with the elected representatives (Held 2006). Political leadership 
performed in such an enclosed and regulated environment ensures that responsible 
representatives may be held accountable on Election Day (Bovens et al. 2014). Reforms 
aimed at strengthening representative political leadership should encourage and fortify elected 
representatives in their endeavours to set agendas and develop appropriate solutions to 
identified problems. Necessary support to implement policies would come from the 
administrative staff. Reforms aimed at strengthening political leadership could therefore be 
about strengthening the hierarchical chain of command and control between the elected 
council and the administration. 
In their ground-breaking comparative work on local executives, Mouritzen and Svara (2002) 
show how executive power may reside with one political leader, usually the mayor, or be 
dispersed among several leaders. In Denmark and Norway, where local government has 
traditionally been characterized by the dispersal and sharing of power within the council and 
by practices of consultation and coalition building, leadership would typically be performed 
by collective bodies (Hendriks and Karsten 2014:50). 
Participatory political leadership 
As opposed to representative elitist notions of democracy, participatory models require 
involved citizen participation in policy development between elections (Hendriks and Karsten 
2014; Greasly and Stoker 2008). Citizen involvement is assumed to generate relevant 
knowledge, identify resources, and spur commitment in the community, resulting in 
innovative and accurate policies that are supported by the community and, therefore, easy to 
implement (Smith 2009). Participatory models of democracy promote involvement and 
learning and are assumed to infuse knowledge and resources into the leadership processes, 
thereby enhancing efficiency (Chambers 2006:104; Haus and Sweeting 2006). A participatory 
approach would demand that political leaders collaborate with actors outside the council in 
setting agenda, pointing out solutions, and mobilizing resources to implement policies decided 
on. The collaborative view has experienced an upsurge in recent decades, often referring to 
the growing need for politicians to mobilize resources and support in various groups in order 
to provide increasingly costly public services (Leach and Wilson 2002; Morrell and Hartley 
2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2016). 
Collaborative political leadership may be defined as leadership styles where leaders are 
assumed to increase their power by sharing it (Dyhrberg-Noerregaard and Kjær 2014) and is 
captured inter alia in Svara’s (1990) description of facilitative leadership. Facilitative 




leadership allows political leaders to “accomplish objectives through enhancing the efforts of 
others” (1990:87) and “promotes positive interaction and a high level of communication 
among officials in city government and with the public and [...] also provides guidance in goal 
setting and policy making” (Svara 2003:157). Democracy inspires shared or distributed 
leadership since any citizen with a cause or a grievance, can legitimately take up a leadership 
role and mobilize people to support (Kane, Patapan and t’Hart 2009:2). Tendencies towards 
dispersion of political power is therefore likely to occur, not only between the political and 
other domains (Kane et al. 2009:5), but also within the political domain, between self-defined 
groups of citizens (Bolden, 2011; Gronn, 2002; Pearce and Conger 2003 Pearce, Conger, & 
Locke, 2008).  
The relation between ideals and institutional reforms? 
While the two notions of democratic political leadership can be related to quite different 
institutional designs aimed at regulating the inherent tension between self-government and 
leadership, they should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Rather, as demonstrated by 
Hendriks and Karsten (2014), political leaders operate in hybrid regimes where different 
models of democracy are combined. Moreover, the relation between institutional (re)form, 
democratic ideals and political leadership may be more complex than suggested by this crude 
distinction, as, for example, strengthening sovereign leadership of the mayor can serve as a 
means towards participatory ideals by providing the mayor with an increased mandate to 
facilitate and broker networked policy processes (Steyvers, Reynaert and Valcke 2012).  
As previously indicated, institutional reforms are seldomly explained purely as the results of 
decoupled shifts in prevailing democratic ideals, but are more often interpreted as responses 
to shifting contexts presenting political leaders with new dilemmas and challenges (e.g. 
Fukuyama 2014; Denters and Rose 2005a; Torfing et al. 2012). Based on the latter 
assumption, we can assume that the patterns in the choice of institutional reforms reflect how 
local decision-makers experience such imperatives for change and what they perceive as 
necessary to strengthen local political leadership. Accordingly, with data collected from the 
interviews in the second part of our study, the stated intentions and justification informing the 
reforms have been applied to develop the typology presented below. To qualify as a reform 
addressing political leadership, the reforms should aim at improving the politicians’ ability to 
perform at least one of the three core leadership functions discussed above.    




Case selection and presentation of case countries 
Denmark and Norway are ideal “most likely” cases for studying variations of reforms in 
institutional design aimed at strengthening political leadership (Flyvbjerg 2006). The Nordic 
countries are generally recognized for high-quality public sectors (Greve, Rykkja and Lægreid 
2016). In addition, local governance in both Norway and Denmark is characterized by an 
extensive political decentralization and along with the other Nordic countries enjoy the 
highest level of autonomy on almost all variables (Ladner, Keuffer & Baldersheim 2016). 
This allows for local experimentation with and variation in choice of institutional designs, 
which makes Denmark and Norway highly relevant cases for the scope of this study.  
Denmark and Norway are relatively similar countries – both unitary states with ambitious 
welfare states where the municipalities are core welfare providers (Rose and Ståhlberg 2005; 
Aarsæther and Mikalsen 2015). Municipalities are run by local councils, which are 
democratically elected every fourth year. The municipal council is the highest municipal body 
and being elected as a councillor entails responsibility for important public assets and 
dispositions. The task portfolio of the municipalities in the two countries is quite similar the 
councils being responsible for providing services within education (pre-school, primary and 
lower secondary schools), health and social care (primary health services, elderly care, 
homecare, social welfare, etc.), utilities (water supply, sewerage, waste), local roads, spatial 
planning, firefighting, public libraries, integration of immigrants, environmental protection, 
and culture. 
In both Denmark and Norway, local governments are, with some restrictions, allowed to decide 
the specific design of the political organization in their municipalities. and have considerable 
discretion regarding institutional design. The local council may, for example, alter the 
committee structure of the council, the frequency and form of their meetings, the degree of 
delegation to the administration, the extent of citizens-involvement in policy development 
processes, and so on.  
The relationship between politicians and administrators and the role of the mayor is, however, 
somewhat differently regulated in the two countries. As de jure leader of the administrative 
organization, the Danish mayor has more extensive formal powers and responsibilities than 
the Norwegian mayor (Sletnes 2015). The Norwegian mayor, however, has vast informal 
powers, partly due to the organization of contact between the political and administrative 
systems: the so-called ‘hourglass model’ (Mikalsen and Bjørnå 2015). In practice, this means 
that the contact between the political and administrative parts of the municipal organization is 




largely restricted to the mayor and the chief administrator. Political leadership may, in other 
words, mainly be exercised in the narrow neck between the two bulbs of the hourglass. The 
ideal of a clear-cut separation of politics and administration has also been dominant in 
Denmark but has been applied in a more pragmatic manner, resulting in a more collaborative 
practice between political leaders and administrative staff (Christensen, Christiansen and 
Ibsen 2011).  
Norway is more sparsely populated than Denmark: The 5.3 million Norwegians are spread 
over an area nine times larger than the 5.8 million Danes enjoy. Although most Norwegians 
live in urban areas, half of Norway’s 422 municipalities have less than 5,000 inhabitants. On 
average, a Norwegian municipality has about 12,000 citizens, while the average population of 
the 98 Danish municipalities is approximately 57,000. This means that the administrative 
resources in the local municipalities are expectedly less specialized in Norway than in 
Denmark.    
In 2007, a major structural reform was carried out in Denmark, reducing the number of 
municipalities from 271 to 98. In Denmark, the amalgamation reform has created larger local 
organizations, and an increased distance between the citizens and their political leaders 
(Hansen 2015; Nielsen and Vestergård 2010). A similar structural reform was initiated in 
Norway in 2015, but the result of this reform is still unclear.  
Since the financial crisis, Danish municipalities have been worse off financially than their 
Norwegian counterparts and have been obliged to reduce public spending. This has 
encouraged municipalities to look around for new, more efficient ways of providing welfare 
services, and to mobilize alternative resources (Larsen 2014).  
Research design and methods 
As depicted in Figure 1, several research strategies were applied in the mapping of 
institutional design changes presented in this paper. 
 
 





Figure 1: Research Design and methods 
The first part of our study was an initial mapping with the aim of identifying a larger case 
collection of municipalities that had recently made changes to the institutional forms or work 
practices of the municipal council. Rather than generating a representative selection of cases, 
this part of the study was designed to gain an overview of the diversity of institutional design 
reforms at play. In both Norway and Denmark, we assembled two separate expert panels who 
were asked to point to relevant municipalities. In Norway, the first panel consisted of 10 
academic experts, while the second included 25 administrative practitioners on the national 
and regional levels. The latter panel included administrative practitioners from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, the Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities, and all 17 County Governors’ Offices in Norway. In Denmark, 
similarly, the first panel counted seven academic experts, while the second consisted of six 
administrative practitioners including Administrative CEOs, chief consultants and external 
consultants specialized in municipal development. Furthermore, a crowdsourcing strategy was 
included in the research design. In Norway, an advertisement was placed in a widely read 
magazine aimed at municipal organizations named Kommunal Rapport. In Denmark, articles 
advertising the mapping were published in two magazines aimed at readers within local 




governments: DenOffentlige.dk and Danske kommuner. In all these publications, readers were 
explicitly asked to notify the project team about municipalities relevant to the project.  
In the second part of the study, structured phone interviews were conducted in all Danish and 
Norwegian municipalities where design reforms were identified. For the interviews, 
informants with in-depth knowledge of the identified measures and changes were sought, 
mainly among the political or administrative leadership. A total of 70 phone interviews were 
conducted by the authors. The interviews followed a common interview guide with questions 
exploring the nature of the institutional reforms and the reasons for implementing these 
reforms. Informants were also asked to point out other municipalities implementing 
institutional design changes, thereby adding an element of snowballing to the mapping. In 
Norway, the initial mapping and the following interviews identified a total of 27 reforms 
spread across 20 different municipalities. In Denmark, we identified 59 reforms in 23 
municipalities. These reforms met two criteria: First, they were aimed at strengthening one or 
more of the three core functions of political leadership (agenda setting, solution finding, and 
resource mobilisation). Second, we only included reforms that were autonomously initiated at 
the local level. Inter-municipal projects were thus excluded from the mapping. Since many 
municipalities were found to implement more than one reform, the number of reforms 
exceeded the number of municipalities.  
The initial mapping and interviews assisted us in developing a typology of institutional 
reforms supporting four different forms of political leadership. However, to validly map the 
extent and variations in institutional reform, the third part of the study conducted a survey 
involving all 422 Norwegian and 98 Danish municipalities. The survey was sent to the 
administrative chief responsible for supporting the local council in the municipality in the fall 
of 2018. The response rate in Norway was 74 % and in Denmark 86 %. The respondents were 
asked whether the institutional reforms mapped in the first and second part of the study were 
used in the municipality. All types of institutional reforms were univocally connected to one 
of the forms of political leadership in the developed typology, enabling us to aggregate sub-
scores to an average for all four categories of political leadership.  
In the following, we present a typology of institutional designs strengthening four types of 
political leadership. The four-fold typology emerged as we sought to fit the empirical 
evidence of design reforms identified in the first and second part of the study, to our 




preconceptions of ideal types of political leadership. The typology hence has both a 
theoretical and an empirical baisis.   
A typology of political leadership. 
Based on the initial mapping and interviews, we developed a broad categorization of design 
reforms. Our deductive point of departure was that political leadership is often theorized in 
terms of either a representative or a participatory democratic ideal. We therefore started 
mapping the design reforms in these two groups: reforms aimed at strengthening the internal 
power of councils, and reforms aimed at strengthening politicians’ interaction with citizens or 
other stakeholders.   
While many reforms fitted neatly into one of the two categories, part of the empirical data 
continued to resist the two initial categories.  First, it became clear that within the category of 
representative leadership reforms, two rather distinct goals were being pursued: While some 
institutional reforms were particularly aimed at strengthening the mayor or the council’s 
executive board, others were aimed at the city council as a collective entity. We therefore 
distinguish between executive and collective political leadership, in line with Mouritzen, & 
Svara (2002) and Hendriks & Karsten (2014). 
One group of participatory reforms was distinct in its ambition to promote communication 
and collaboration between politicians and citizens. These reforms, which we labelled 
collaborative leadership, aimed to engage citizens by i.e. arranging citizens meetings, debates 
and collaborative committees to bring citizens’ input into the policy process. A second sub-
category of participatory reforms, which we eventually identified as a category of distributive 
leadership, included arrangements that delegated power to sub-municipal entities governed by 
self-recruited citizens formally accountable neither to the council nor to the local community.  
This form of political leaderhip is rooted in a procual understandings of leadership, which 
involves that power and influence is shared or distributed among a plurality of actors 
regardsless of their formal leadership (Bolden, 2011; Gronn, 2002). 
We argue that these four identified reform types can be placed along two axes according to 
the goal they pursue. The first axis labelled “ideal of power dispersion”, refers to how 
dispersed political power should be. The second axis labelled “democratic ideal”, refers to the 
initial distinction between the representative ideal of retaining the power within the municipal 
organization and the participatory ideal of sharing power with citizens. In Figure 2, we place 
the four types of leadership reforms along the two axes. 





Figure 2: Typology of political leadership  
While both executive and collective political leadership supports a representative democratic 
ideal, reforms for collective political leadership aim at dispersing power among the 
democratically elected. Equally, collaborative and distributive leadership reforms both build 
on participatory, democratic ideals, but while reforms for collaborative leadership 
acknowledge that decisions should be made by the municipality as a unitary and centralized 
entity, reforms for distributive leadership aim at dispersing political power throughout the 
municipality to sub-units, not answering to the municipal council as supreme power holder.  
Based on the interviews, in the following we describe the four types of leadership reforms and 
the stated reasons for introducing them in more detail. 
Executive political leadership  
The first group of institutional design reforms focuses on strengthening the position of what 
can be considered the top political leadership: The mayor, the committee leaders, and the 
executive board. The executive reforms identified through the reform mapping in Danish and 
Norwegian municipalities include e.g. delegating extended decision-making powers to either 
of these positions, the hiring of advisors to support the top political leadership, schemes for 




coordinating the efforts and plans of the committee leaders, and instigation of regular 
meetings among the top political leadership. 
Interviewees in both Denmark and Norway pointed to the need to boost the executive power 
of the municipality when explaining these reforms: The top political leadership were 
bestowed with extra powers to make the political executive power more efficient and to 
increase the political decision-making capacity. The narrative justifying this need was often 
one of previous political inertia and inability to make tough but necessary decisions. 
Moreover, empowering the executive leadership was seen as a way to counter the very strong 
position of the Chief Administrator.. As a political advisor from a Norwegian town explained: 
“I help the mayor put politics on the professional assessments of the administration”.   
Collective political leadership 
The second group of institutional design reforms focuses on strengthening all council 
representatives’ potential to perform political leadership. The collective design reforms cover 
a broad range of institutional arrangements, including provding tailored training or regularly 
thematic workshops for elected representatives to enhance their capacity in policy-making; 
new meeting forms designed to spur political discussion; schemes for information exchange 
with or learning from the municipal administration (or particular public services); or city 
council protocols ensuring all councillors have the opportunity to speak.  
As with the executive reforms, the collective reforms were also  explained with the need to 
strengthen the politicians’ vis a vis the administration. However, whereas the executive 
reforms were aimed at regaining political decision-making power previously delegated to the 
administration, the collective reforms were justified with reference to policy development 
power. There seemed to be a widespread concern that the administration had become too 
powerful in terms of agendasetting and the actual development of solutions and policies.. 
Several of the interviewees stressed that the politicians should take a more active part in 
developing policies, and especially that policies “with a clear political character should be 
prepared by a political committee and not by the chief administrator”. 
The argument that the administration has grown too powerful was present in both countries, 
but received much more emphasis in Norwegian municipalities. Most notably, informants 
talked about “reinstating the politicians as leaders”, and “taking the power from the 
administration and giving it back to the politicians”. Informants suggested that the underlying 
structural factor responsible for the imbalance between politicians and administration was the 




system in which the chief administrator prepares all political cases and recommends how the 
council shall vote. Thus, political leadership in the sense of setting agenda and pointing out 
solutions was perceived as being dominated by the chief administrator in collaboration with 
the mayor, while paralyzing the rest of the council. 
Collaborative political leadership 
Informed by a participatory, democratic ideal, institutional reforms aimed at supporting 
collaborative political leadership are intended to involve citizens and other relevant municipal 
actors in processes of policy development. Collaborative reforms establish arenas where 
politicians and citizens can join forces in defining problems, developing solutions and 
mobilizing the necessary resources. An example of this type of reform is the formation of 
collaborative ad hoc committees, in which citizens are invited to join the elected 
representatives in developing policy in a specific area. 
Collaborative design reforms were justified with reference both to the input and to the output 
side of politics. As for the input side, collaborative models were justified by deontological 
arguments: Collaboration should take place because it is the right thing to do. Democracy 
means governing by the people and collaborating with the people will move policy 
development closer to this ideal. A number of informants also pointed to the democratic 
principle that people affected by a decision should be able to influence on it.  
As for the output side, policies developed in collaboration with citizens were often considered 
more innovative, as citizens are expected to bring “fresh air” into the council hall in the form 
of new ideas and new knowledge. Moreover, some of the interviewees assumed that when 
with citizens, politicians would be released from their party political “reins” and be able to 
think more freely. 
A final and very much referredargument for collaborative arrangements was the necessity of 
drawing on a wider set of resources than those available within the municipal administration. 
“Because there are not enough resources to deliver the services the citizens need, we must 
open up the process (of welfare production) to the citizens”, an informant in one municipality 
said. In another municipality an informant explained that “The main aim of the [collaborative 
committees] was to mobilize existing resources beyond those at the disposal of the municipal 
organization”.  




Distributive political leadership 
As with collaborative designs, distributive design reforms are also inspired by the 
participatory democratic ideal. They deviate from collaborative reforms, however, in that the 
political power is not shared but rather delegated to groups of non-elected citizens. Thus, 
these reforms are rooted in distributive or shared leadership ideals in which self-governance 
becomes the objective (Bolden, 2011; Gronn, 2002). Examples include funding or facilitation 
of citizen-driven initiatives or projects, and delegation of decision-making power to non-
elected groups. These initiatives may be small (e.g., citizens proposing to plant flowers along 
the road if the municipality provides fees) or they may be larger (e.g., citizens initiating 
schemes for integrating immigrants into their neighbourhoods). 
Such power distribution involves a shift in the democratic ideal towards self-governance 
rather than co-governance. The distributive reforms could be interpreted as measures not 
strengthening, but instead weakening, political leadership. However, our informants presented 
the distributive arrangements as measures to strengthen local political leadership: First, the 
arrangements were assumed to the council of the burden of making detailed decisions 
requiring local knowledge, thereby freeing time for strategically important policy-making. 
Second, as with collaborative leadership reforms, the distributive reforms were assumed to 
mobilize resources locally. And third, the distributive reforms were also deontologically 
justified – it was deemed right and legitimate to let those affected decide in matters 
concerning them.  
Cross-national variation and why?  
In the initial mapping of design reforms, all the 86 identified cases were assigned to one of the 
four reform types. In the few cases where a reform supported more than one type of 
leadership, the primary aim of the reform as defined by the interviewee, was used to decide on 
the categorization. The sorting of all 86 cases showed that 8% of the design reforms fell in the 
category of executive leadership, 27% in the category of collective leadership, 43 % in the 
category of collaborative leadership and 22% in the category of distributive leadership. The 
results from the initial mapping helped us form a picture of the landscape of leadership 
reforms, but as the cases were selected through a non-random mechanism, the variation of 
different reforms did not allow us to conclude on the prevalence of each reform type. 
Based on the typology of the initial mapping, we developed a survey questionnaire that was 
sent to the chief administrators of all Danish and Norwegian municipalities. The questions 
were designed to capture the observed variation in the four different types of reforms: 




executive, collective, collaborative, and distributive. The operationalizations and frequencies 
of the four reform types are displayed in Table 1. Table 1 contains two types of information: 
First, the percentage of municipalities within each country that has implemented different 
institutional designs are displayed. Second, a score is displayed for each of the four categories 
of institutional design. The score is computed by adding the proportion of municipalities 
having implemented the three types of institutional design within each category, divided by 
three. 
 






Table 1: Mapped institutional reforms grouped according to type of political leadership. 
Percentage of municipalities with different types of institutional reforms. 





Table 1 shows that the institutional reforms aimed at strengthening political leadership are 
used more extensively in Denmark than in Norway across all four categories. The average 
number of institutional arrangements for strengthening political leadership varies between 3.6 
in Norwegian and 7.6 in Danish municipalities. These results supports the initial impression 
from the pre-case study. In particular, institutional reforms supporting distributive reforms are 
widely implemented in Denmark while only very scarcely implemented in Norway. 
Moreover, the survey data reveal that municipalities implement design reforms across the four 
categories, indicating that institutional reforms strengthening different forms of political 
leadership are used as supplements rather than as substitutions.   
While the survey data do not allow us to fully explain the observed variation in reform 
patterns, the qualitative data from the interviews give some pointers towards explaining how 
national contexts inform the choice of reform. 
Discussion  
The study provides new understanding about how institutional reforms are used to strengthen 
different forms of political leadership and shows significant differences between Danish and 
Norwegian municipalities. While the prevalence of all types of reforms is higher in Denmark, 
the reasons given for choosing a certain design reform are fairly consistent across 
municipalities and across countries: Reforms strengthening sovereign leaderships are 
explained by the interviewees as countermoves to too-powerful administrations while reforms 
strengthening participatory leadership are explained as a remedy to a perceived loss of contact 
between citizens and their elected representatives. In the Danish context, where the latter 
perception was far more pronounced, this need to reconnect citizens and their elected 
representatives is, to some extent, explained by the interviewees as a consequence of the 
increased distance put between the two by the amalgamation reform. Moreover, in Denmark, 
the extensive implementation of either collaborative or distributive institutional reforms is 
explained with reference to poor municipal economy. While Norwegian municipalities also 
justify such reforms in economic terms, this is more often done with reference to a possible 
future decline. The fact that Denmark was more severely hit by the financial crisis of 2008 
than Norway wastherefore appears to be one reason why more Danish municipalities 
introduce participatory reforms aimed at resource mobilization. 




While the justifications for reforms provided in the qualitative data give some partial 
explanations for the observed differences, there may also be other explanations for the much 
more extensive use of institutional design reforms in Danish municipalities. For example, it 
could be argued that the bigger Danish municipalities imply bigger administrative 
developmental resources. Adopting new ideas of institutional design requires translators that 
can both de- and re-contextualize concepts into the organizational practice (Røvik 2011).  The 
reform eagerness of Danish municipalities may, thus, also be connected with greater 
developmental “muscles” associated with competences, norms and resources supporting 
translation of new ideas.   
Whether reforms of political leadership are strategically picked to address underlying 
structural problems or whether problems are understood in light of existing norms is a 
question largely left unanswered by our data. Both by defining the borders for acceptable 
political action and by providing ready-made solutions for policy problems that arise within 
their domain, political discourse and prevailing ideas of political leadership play key roles in 
the formative moment of institutional development (Peters 2012). The justifications for 
reforms mapped in our study may therefore be equally indicative of a common dominant 
discourse, providing ready-at-hand justifications, as they are of underlying structural 
problems. The rhetoric of collaboration and co-creation has for some time dominated the 
public discussion about how to organize local democracy in Denmark (see Torfing and 
Triantafillou, 2017). As ideological constructs, such concepts can be understood as 
intertwined with the somewhat exaggerated claims attached to interactive governance, both 
among policy makers and in academic discourse (for discussion, see Torfing et al., 2012 and 
Davies, 2011). Although attempts have been made by actors at the national level in Norway to 
adopt the same mind-set – both the Ministry of Local Government and the Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities have launched several initiatives in this regard 
– the idea, it seems from the interviews made in this study, has not to the same extent 
resonated with the public or the politicians on the local level. This may be because it 
addresses a problem not (yet) perceived as important, or because Norwegian political 
traditions differ from those of the Danish in more significant ways than anticipated. For 
example, as anthropological observers have noted, the institutions of local government in 
Norway are highly characterized by their long-lasting traditions for wide political 
participation and an intertwinement between governmental bodies and civil society on a local 
level (Barnes, 1954; Park, 1998; Vike, 2018). Accordingly, the call for new reforms 




promoting collaborative or distributive leadership might, thus, find less resonance among 
local decision-makers who deem such participatory practices to be already in place.  
One important observation from our study is that institutional design reforms supporting 
different forms of political leadership often co-exist within the same municipalities. The data, 
however, does not univocally reveal whether this coexistence is harmonious or conflictual. On 
the one hand it might be argued that power cannot simultaneously be kept and shared or even 
distributed; on the other, the complexity of political leadership means that the use of only one 
form of political leadership across all cases and contexts appears too simplistic. For example, 
some municipalities argue that they need to strengthen the collaboration and horizontal 
political leadership among the politicians before they can bring citizens into the process of co-
creating policy. In this case, strengthening sovereign political leadership is a prerequisite to 
enhancing collaborative leadership. These examples, while not representative, illustrate the 
need for further understanding of how, and to what extent, various forms of institutional 
designs  interplay.   
 
Conclusion  
The aim of this article was to explore and map which forms of political leadership are 
promoted through locally initiated, institutional design reforms in Danish and Norwegian 
municipalities.  
Through a three-stepped process employing a mixed-methods research design, we set out to 
explore the variation of locally initiated institutional reforms aimed at strengthening political 
leadership in Norwegian and Danish municipalities. Through an initial mapping aimed at 
identifying the variety of reforms in play, and the qualitative investigation of reforms 
conducted, we developed a typology of reforms based on the type of political leadership ideal 
they are aimed at promoting. The conceptual typology presented in this article suggests that 
the identified institutional reforms can be categorized into two types of representative and two 
types of participatory reforms that support executive, collective, collaborative and distributive 
political leadership. By operationalizing the developed typology, we mapped the prevalence 
of the identified institutional design (re)forms applied in the two countries through a survey to 
all Norwegian and Danish municipalities.  
Our study reveals significant differences between the two countries. The most striking finding 
is that all types of institutional designs forms are used much more extensively in Denmark 




than in Norway. Moreover, the study reveals interesting differences regarding the choice of 
reform types and their justifications. Particularly, reforms supporting distributive political 
leadership are common in Denmark, while only very scarcely used in Norway. The qualitative 
interviews in our study reveal that participatory (both collaborative and distributive) reforms 
are frequently justified as a means towards reducing the distance between politicians and 
citizens. In the Danish setting, this need is partially connected to the extensive amalgamation 
reforms in 2007, which has, arguably, increased the distance between citizens and their 
elected political representatives. Moreover, participatory reforms are also frequently justified 
in economic terms as a means towards mobilizing resources beyond the disposal of the 
municipal organization.  
While in both countries reforms strengthening sovereign (executive and collective) leadership 
are frequently emphasized as a means towards strengthening politicians vis-à-vis a too-
powerful administration, this tendency in justifying reforms was far more outspoken by the 
Norwegian informants. Our data does not provide any definitive explanation as to this 
observation. However, it seems reasonable to speculate that the aforementioned cross-national 
differences in how the relationship between politics and administration is regulated may 
provide some explanation to why the power relation between the two seems to be given more 
attention in the Norwegian than in the Danish setting.  
Given the extensive local autonomy with regard to institutional setup, variation in reform 
design is likely to occur in both Norway and Denmark. And indeed we find great variation in 
institutional designs in both countries. Whether a similar pattern would be found in countries 
with low organizationsl autonomy at the local level, is doubtful. Moreover, as our study 
shows, specific circumstances and contexts are likely to affect perceptions of problems and 
corresponding choices of institutional reforms. However, there is reason to believe that, if not 
the volume or relative distribution of reform types, then the typology is relevant also to other 
countries. The ideological ideas on which the design reforms are based, are universal 
democratic ideas providing answers to problems likely to occur in any democratic setting, 
addressing the relations between executive and collective power, between administration and 
politicians and between politicians and citizens.  
Our findings highlight the need for more extensive knowledge on how contextual factors 
inform political innovation on a local level, and thus the institutional pathways of local 
political institutions. Another, logical next question is also whether, and under what 




conditions, the reforms work as intended. Future research is encouraged to explore this and 
other relevant questions in an effort to nuance and elaborate the findings of this article.  
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